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Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cass R. Sunstein*
“The American people have no doubt that more people die from coal dust
than from nuclear reactions, but they fear the prospect of a nuclear reactor more
than they do the empirical data that would suggest that more people die from coal
dust, having coal-fired burners. They also know that more lives would be saved if
we took that 25 percent we spend in the intensive care units in the last few months
of the elderly’s lives, more children would be saved. But part of our culture is that
we have concluded as a culture that we are going to rightly, or wrongly, we are
going to spend the money, costing more lives, on the elderly. . . . I think it’s
incredibly presumptuous and elitist for political scientists to conclude that the
American people’s cultural values in fact are not ones that lend themselves to a
cost-benefit analysis and presume that they would change their cultural values if in
Joseph Biden
fact they were aware of the cost-benefit analysis.”1

Many people have argued for cost-benefit analysis on economic grounds.2
On their view, a primary goal of regulation is to promote economic efficiency,
and cost-benefit analysis is admirably well-suited to that goal. Arguments of this
kind have met with sharp criticism from those who reject the efficiency criterion3
or who believe that in practice, cost-benefit analysis is likely to produce a kind of
regulatory paralysis.4
In this essay I offer support for cost-benefit analysis, not from the standpoint
of conventional economics, but on grounds associated with cognitive psychology
and behavioral economics. My basic suggestion is that cost-benefit analysis is
best defended as a means of overcoming predictable problems in individual and
social cognition. Most of these problems might be collected under the general
heading of selective attention. Cost-benefit analysis should be understood as a
method for putting “on screen” important social facts that might otherwise
escape private and public attention. Thus understood, cost-benefit analysis is a
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School. I
am grateful to Matthew Adler, Jill Hasday, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner for helpful comments on a
previous draft; special thanks to Eric Posner for many helpful discussions. Brian Lehman and Brooke May
provided excellent research assistance and valuable comments and criticisms.
1 Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer, to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (July 14, 1994) (Miller Reporting
transcript).
2 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public & Private Responsibilities for Risk (1992); W. Kip Viscusi,
Risk Equity, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000).
3 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).
4 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal
Bureaucracy (1991).
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way of ensuring better priority-setting and of overcoming predictable obstacles
to desirable regulation, whatever may be our criteria for deciding the hardest
questions about that topic.
Of course much of the controversy over cost-benefit analysis stems from the
difficulty of specifying, with particularity, what that form of analysis entails.
None of the cognitive points made here supports any particular understanding
of cost-benefit analysis. Certainly I do not mean to embrace the controversial and
indeed implausible proposition that all regulatory decisions should be made by
aggregating private willingness to pay, as if economic efficiency is or should be
the goal of all regulation.5 I will attempt instead to provide an understanding of
cost-benefit analysis that is agnostic on large issues of the right and the good, and
that can attract support from people with diverse theoretical commitments, or
with uncertainty about the appropriate theoretical commitments.6 In this sense I
attempt to produce an incompletely theorized agreement on a certain form of costbenefit analysis—an agreement on a form of cost-benefit analysis to which many
different people, with diverse and competing views, should be willing to
subscribe. This is partly an attempt to respond to the most natural objection to
my principal claim here, an objection that would stress the possibility that
cognitive problems would reappear in the values that end up being associated
with various states of affairs.
The paper is organized as follows. In sections I, II, and III, I seek to defend
the general idea of cost-benefit analysis, not as embodying any sectarian
conception of value, but as a way of overcoming predictable problems in
understanding risks to life and health at both the individual and social levels. In
section IV, I briefly attempt to specify what cost-benefit analysis might be
understood to entail. My goal is to show how this method, conceived in a
particular way, might attract support from people with varying conceptions of
the good and the right, including, for example, neoclassical economists and those
who are quite skeptical about some normative claims in neoclassical economics,
and including those who do and who do not take private preferences, and
willingness to pay, as the proper foundation for regulatory policy. In other
5 See Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 1999);
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice ch. 9 (1997); Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000) ; Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming
2000). See, in particular, Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 Am. Eon. Rev. 1, 17 (1995) (“There
are plenty of social choice problems in all this, but in analyzing them, we have to go beyond looking only
for the best reflection of given individual preferences, or the most acceptable procedures for choices based
on those preferences.”) (emphasis in original).
6 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note, which is in the same general spirit as
this essay, and from which I have learned a great deal. See also Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000), which seems to me in the same basic family.
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words, I try to show how a certain understanding of cost-benefit analysis might
contain considerable appeal precisely because it overcomes problems in
individual cognition, and do so without taking a stand on controversial issues
about the ultimate goals of regulation and law.
A. A Tale of Two Tables
Let us begin with two simple tables. It is well known that there is a great deal
of variability in national expenditures per life saved. Consider the following,
which has come to define many discussions of these problems7:
Table 1: Cost Per Life Saved
Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Regulations
Cost per premature
death averted
($ millions 1990)

Regulation

Agency

Unvented Space Heater Ban

CPSC

0.1

Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection Standard

FAA

0.1

Auto Passive Restraint/Seat Belt Standards

NHTSA

0.1

Steering Column Protection Standard

NHTSA

0.1

Underground Construction Standards

OSHA-S

0.1

Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards

EPA

0.2

Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability Standard

FAA

0.4

Alcohol and Drug Control Standards

FRA

0.4

Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard

NHTSA

0.4

Standards for Servicing Auto Wheel Rims

OSHA-S

0.4

Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting Standard

FAA

0.6

Concrete & Masonry Construction Standards

OSHA-S

0.6

Crane Suspended Personnel Platform Standard

OSHA-S

0.7

Passive Restraints for Trucks & Buses (Proposed)

NHTSA

0.7

Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic)

NHTSA

0.8

Children’s Sleepwear Flammability Ban

CPSC

0.8

Auto Side Door Support Standards

NHTSA

0.8

Low Altitude Windshear Equipment & Training Standards

FAA

1.3

Electrical Equipment Standards (Metal Mines)

MSHA

1.4

Trenching and Excavation Standards

OSHA-S

1.5

7 Based on data from Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal
Year 1992 Pt 2, 370 Tbl C-2 (GPO 1991).
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Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Regulations
Cost per premature
death averted
($ millions 1990)

Regulation

Agency

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) Systems

FAA

1.5

Hazard Communication Standard

OSHA-S

1.6

Side-Impact Standards for Trucks, Buses, and MPVs (Proposed)

NHTSA

2.2

Grain Dust Explosion Prevention Standards

OSHA-S

2.8

Rear Lap/Shoulder Belts for Autos

NHTSA

3.2

Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines

EPA

3.4

Benzine NESHAP (Original: Fugitive Emissions)

EPA

3.4

Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard

EPA

5.7

Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke Byproducts)

EPA

6.1

Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

8.3

Benzene Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

8.9

Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines)

MSHA

9.2

Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants

EPA

13.5

Ethylene Oxide Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

20.5

Arsenic/Copper NESHAP

EPA

23.0

Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum Refining Sludge

EPA

27.6

Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive Sites)

EPA

31.7

Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations)

EPA

32.9

Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active Sites)

EPA

45.0

Acrylonitrile Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

51.5

Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

63.5

Lockout/Tagout

OSHA-S

70.9

Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

74.0

Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

106.9

Asbestos Ban

EPA

110.7

Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Cattlefeed Ban

FDA

124.8

Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations)

EPA

168.2

1,2 Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard

EPA

653.0

Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (1st 3rd)

EPA

4,190.4

Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Standards (Proposed)

EPA

19,107.0

Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit

OSHA-H

86,201.8

Atrazine/Alachlor Drinking Water Standard

EPA

92,069.7

Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood-Preserving Chemicals

EPA

5,700,000
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This table should be taken with many grains of salt.8 It does not contain
nearly all of the benefits from regulation, including those that fall short of
mortalities averted (including illnesses averted, benefits for animals, and
aesthetic and recreational gains). An adequate cost-benefit analysis would
certainly take those benefits into account. We will shortly see that the table
depends on many contentious assumptions, above all involving the appropriate
discount rate; modest changes in the discount rate can greatly reduce the
expenditures and the disparities. But at the very least, the table creates a
presumption that the current system of regulation suffers from serious
misallocation of resources. It also suggests that with better allocations, we could
obtain large gains. Indeed, a recent study finds that it would be possible to save
the same number of lives that we now save with tens of billions of dollars left
over—and that better priority-setting could save 60,000 lives, and 636,000 lifeyears, annually at the same price.9
What is the source of the misallocations? Interest-group power undoubtedly
plays a substantial role, as well-organized groups are able to obtain measures in
their interest or to fend off measures that would harm them, and as poorly
organized ones typically fail. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis might be defended
partly as a corrective to interest-group power, operating as it might as a kind of
technocratic check on measures that would do little good or even produce net
harm (and also on measures that do much less good than they should).10 But
officials are of course responsive not only to interest groups but also to general
public pressures, and thus part of the answer must lie in the distinctive
judgments of ordinary people, who do not assess risks through a well-informed
cost-benefit lens. Indeed, divergences between expert and lay assessments of
risks have been demonstrated in many places. Consider this comparison.11
Table 2: Rating health risks
Public

EPA Experts

1. Hazardous waste sites

Medium-to-low

2. Exposure to worksite chemicals

High

3. Industrial pollution of waterways

Low

8 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
9 See Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in LifeSaving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 167, 172-74 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
10 Of course it is possible that the content of the cost-benefit test will reflect interest-group power.
11 See Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 21 (1993).
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Public

EPA Experts

4. Nuclear accident radiation

Not ranked

5. Radioactive waste

Not ranked

6. Chemical leaks from underground storage tanks

Medium-to-low

7. Pesticides

High

8. Pollution from industrial accidents

Medium-to-low

9. Water pollution from farm runoff

Medium

10. Tap water contamination

High

11. Industrial air pollution

High

12. Ozone layer destruction

High

13. Coastal water contamination

Low

14. Sewage-plant water pollution

Medium-to-low

15. Vehicle exhaust

High

16. Oil spills

Medium-to-low

17. Acid rain

High

18. Water pollution from urban runoff

Medium

19. Damaged wetlands

Low

20. Genetic alteration

Low

21. Non-hazardous waste sites

Medium-to-low

22. Greenhouse effect

Low

23. Indoor air pollution

High

24. X-ray radiation

Not ranked

25. Indoor radon

High

26. Microwave oven radiation

Not ranked

The EPA itself has found that EPA policies are responsive not to expert
judgments, but to lay assessments of risks.12 Indeed, EPA policies track ordinary
judgments extremely well.
If we put together these two tables, we can suggest a general hypothesis. The
government currently allocates its limited resources poorly, and it does so partly
because it is responsive to ordinary judgments about the magnitude of risks. A
government that could insulate itself from misinformed judgments could save
tens of thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars annually. Let us attempt
to be more specific about the cognitive problems that help account for current
problems.

12 See id.
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I. Six Problems in the Public Demand for Regulation
For the moment, I attempt no controversial specification of cost-benefit
analysis and understand the term broadly to refer to a regulatory method that
calls for regulators to identify, and make relevant for purposes of decision, the
good effects and the bad effects of regulation, and to quantify those as much as
possible in terms of both dollar equivalents and life-years saved, hospital
admissions prevented, workdays gained, and so forth. Let us also assume that
cost-benefit analysis, thus understood, can accommodate distributional factors,
by, for example, giving distributional weights to certain adverse effects, or by
assuming uniform numbers for various goods (such as increased longevity) so as
to ensure that they do not vary in accordance with wealth.
It is obvious that people, including government officials, often lack riskrelated information; they may not know the nature of the health risks at issue,
nor may they know the adverse consequences of risk reduction. By itself this
point argues for cost-benefit analysis, simply as a means of producing the
relevant information. The public demand for regulation is often be based on
misunderstandings of facts.13 But put this obvious point to one side. Why,
exactly, might people’s judgments about risk and risk regulation go badly
wrong?14 There are six points here.
A. The Availability Heuristic
The first problem is purely cognitive: the use of the availability heuristic in
thinking about risks.15 It is well-established that people tend to think that events
are more probable if they can recall an incident of its occurrence.16 Consider, for
example, the fact that people typically think that more words, on any given page,
will end with the letters “ing,” than have “n” as the second-to-last letter (though
a moment’s reflection shows that this is not possible).17 With respect to risks,
13 A colorful discussion is Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong
Things (1999).
14 Some of these problems may infect market behavior as well, and when this is so there is a problem with
using private willingness to pay as the basis for regulation, since private willingness to pay will (by
hypothesis) be based on a misunderstanding of the facts. But markets contain some safeguards against these
errors, through the budget constraint and opportunities for learning, and in any case the form of cost-benefit
analysis that I support would not rest on mistaken factual judgments, as discussed in more detail below.
15 See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J.
Legal Stud. 747, 749-760 (1990).
16 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982) (describing the availability heuristic).
17 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in
Probability Judgment, 90 Psychol. Rev. 293, 295 (1983).
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judgments are typically affected by the availability heuristic, so that people
overestimate the number of deaths from highly publicized events (motor vehicle
accidents, tornadoes, floods, botulism), but underestimate the number from less
publicized sources (stroke, heart disease, stomach cancer).18 Similarly, much of
the concern with nuclear power undoubtedly stems from its association with
memorable events, including Hiroshima, Chernobyl, and Three-Mile Island.
To the extent that people lack information, or base their judgments on
mental short-cuts that produce errors,19 a highly responsive government is likely
to blunder. Cost-benefit analysis is a natural corrective, above all because it
focuses attention on the actual effects of regulation, including, in some cases, the
existence of surprisingly small benefits from regulatory controls. To this extent
cost-benefit analysis should not be taken as undemocratic, but, on the contrary,
should be seen as a means of fortifying (properly specified) democratic goals, by
ensuring that government decisions are responsive to well-informed public
judgments.
B. Aggravating Social Influences: Informational and Reputational Cascades
The availability heuristic does not, of course, operate in a social vacuum. It
interacts with emphatically social processes, and in particular with informational
and reputational forces.20 When one person says, through words or deeds, that
something is or is not dangerous, he creates an informational externality.21 A signal
by some person A will provide relevant data to others. When there is little
private information, such a signal may initiate an informational cascade, with
significant consequences for private and public behavior, and with possibly
distorting effects on regulatory policy.22
Imagine, for example, that A says that abandoned hazardous waste sites are
dangerous, or that A initiates protest activity because such a site is located
nearby. B, otherwise skeptical or in equipoise, may go along with A; C, otherwise
an agnostic, may be convinced that if A and B share the relevant belief, the belief
18 Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 218 (2d ed. 1994).
19 Other heuristics are likely to be at work, such as the representativeness heuristic, but availability is the
most important source of distorted public judgments. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982).
20 I draw in this section on Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999).
21 See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search, 108
Econ. J. 60 (1998).
22 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 720
(1999).
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must be true; and it will take a confident D to resist the shared judgments of A, B,
and C. The result of this set of influences can be social cascades, as hundreds,
thousands, or millions of people come to accept a certain belief simply because of
what they think other people believe.23 There is nothing fanciful to the idea.
Cascade effects help account for the existence of widespread public concern
about abandoned hazardous waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental
hazard), and in more recent years, they spurred grossly excessive public fears of
the pesticide Alar, of risks from plane crashes, and of dangers of shootings in
schools in the aftermath of the murders in Littleton, Colorado. Such effects
recently helped produce massive dislocations in beef production in Europe in
connection with “mad cow disease”; they are currently giving rise to growing
European fear of genetic engineering of food.
On the reputational side, cognitive effects may be amplified as well.24 If
many people are alarmed about some risk, you may not voice your doubts about
whether the alarm is merited, simply in order not to seem obtuse, cruel, or
indifferent. And if many people believe that a certain risk is trivial, you may not
disagree through words or deeds, lest you appear cowardly or confused. The
result of these forces can be cascade effects, mediated by the availability heuristic.
Such effects can produce a public demand for regulation even though the
relevant risks are trivial. At the same time, there may be little or no demand for
regulation of risks that are, in fact, quite large in magnitude. Self-interested
private groups can exploit these forces, often by using the availability heuristic.
Consider the fact that European companies have tried to play up fears of
genetically engineered food as a way of fending off American competition.
Cost-benefit analysis has a natural role here. If it is made relevant to
decision, it can counteract cascade effects induced by informational and
reputational forces, especially when the availability heuristic is at work. The
effect of cost-benefit analysis is to subject a public demand for regulation to a
kind of technocratic scrutiny, to ensure that the demand is not rooted in myth,
and to ensure as well that government is regulating risks even when the public
demand (because insufficiently informed) is low. And here too there is no
democratic problem with the inquiry into consequences. If people’s concern is
fueled by informational forces having little reliability, and if people express
concern even though they are not fearful, a governmental effort to “cool”
popular reactions is hardly inconsistent with democratic ideals. Similarly, there is

23 See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades,
in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathyrn Ierulli eds., 1995).
24 See id. at 727.
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nothing undemocratic about a governmental effort to divert resources to serious
problems that have not been beneficiaries of cascade effects.
C. Dangers On-Screen, Benefits Off-Screen
Why are people so concerned about the risks of nuclear power, when experts
tend to believe that the risks are quite low—lower, in fact, than the risks from
competing energy sources, such as coal-fired power plants, which produce
relatively little public objection? Why do they believe that small risks from
pesticides should be regulated, even if comparatively small risks from X-rays are
quite tolerable?
Suggestive answers come from research suggesting that for many activities
that pose small risks but that nonetheless receive public concern, people perceive
low benefits as well as high risks.25 For example, nuclear power itself is seen as a
low-benefit, high-risk activity. Similar findings appear for some activities that are
in fact relatively high-risk: a judgment of “low risk” accompanies a judgment of
“high benefits.” The very fact that they are known to have high benefits skews
judgment in their favor, and hence makes people understate the costs as well.
The obvious conclusion is that sometimes people favor regulation of some
risks because the underlying activities are not seen to have compensating
benefits.26 Thus for some activities, tradeoffs are not perceived at all. Dangers are
effectively on-screen, but benefits are off-screen. Note that this is not because
such activities do not, in fact, have compensating benefits. It is because of a kind
of perceptual illusion.
An important factor here is loss aversion. People tend to be loss averse, which
means that a loss from the status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is
seen as desirable.27 In the context of risk regulation, the consequence is that any
newly introduced risk, or any aggravation of existing risks, is seen as a serious
problem, even if the accompanying benefits (a gain from the status quo and
hence perceived as less salient and less important) are considerable.28 Thus when
25 The fact that nuclear power, and application of pesticides, produce benefits as well as risks may not
“register” on the lay viewscreen, and this may help produce a “high risk” judgment. See Ali Siddiq
Alhakami and Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk and
Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085, 1088 (1994).
26 See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (1996), for a detailed discussion of how this point bears on the
different risk judgments of experts and lay people.
27 See Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics, in Quasi Rational
Economics 137, 143 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991) (arguing that “losses loom larger than gains”); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325, 1328 (1990); Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in John H.
Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds, The Handbook of Experimental Economics 665-670 (1995).
28 For some policy implications of loss aversion, see Jack L. Knetsch, Reference States, Fairness, and Choice
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a new risk adds danger, people may focus on the danger itself, and not on the
benefits that accompany the danger. And an important problem here is that in
many cases where dangers are on-screen and benefits off-screen, the magnitude
of the danger is actually quite low. Cost-benefit analysis can be a corrective here,
by placing the various effects on-screen.
D. Systemic Effects and “Health-Health Tradeoffs”
Often people focus on small pieces of complex problems, and causal changes
are hard to trace. Consider an analogy. The German psychologist Dietrich Dorner
has done some illuminating computer experiments designed to see whether
people can engage in successful social engineering.29 Participants are asked to
solve problems faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world. Through
the magic of the computer, many policy initiatives are available to solve the
relevant problems (improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling
more wells). But most of the participants produce eventual calamities, because
they do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular interventions.
Only the rare participant can see a number of steps down the road—to
understand the multiple effects of one-shot interventions on the system.
Often regulation has similar systemic effects. A decision to regulate nuclear
power may, for example, increase the demand for coal-fired power plants, with
harmful environmental consequences.30 A decision to impose fuel economy
standards on new cars may cause a “downsizing” of the fleet, and in that way
increase risks to life. A decision to ban asbestos may cause manufacturers to use
less safe substitutes. Regulation of tropospheric ozone may control the health
dangers of ozone, but ozone has various benefits as well, including protection
against cataracts and skin cancer; hence regulation of ozone may cause health
problems equal to those that it reduces.31 Indeed, regulation of ozone will
of Measure to Value Environmental Changes, in Environment, Ethics, and Behavior: The Psychology of
Environmental Valuation and Degradation 52, 64-65 (Max H. Bazerman, David M. Messick, Ann E.
Tenbrunsel & Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni eds., 1997).
29 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them
Right (1996).
30 See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court’s Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1833, 1835-90 (1978). See generally Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of
Regulatory Authority, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1987).
31 See Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the
NAAQS, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 142A, 144A (1997) (estimating that the EPA’s new ozone NAAQS could
cause 25 to 50 more melanoma skin cancer deaths and increase the number of cataract cases by 13,000 to
28,000 each year). See also Ralph L. Keeney & Kenneth Green, Estimating Fatalities Induced by Economic
Impacts of EPA’s Ozone and Particulate Standards 8 (Reason Public Policy Institute, Policy Study No. 225,
June 1997) (calculating that if attainment of the new standards costs $10 billion annually, a number well
within EPA’s estimated cost range, it will contribute to 2,200 premature deaths annually). On the general
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increase electricity prices, and because higher electricity prices will deprive poor
people of air conditioning or lead them to use it less, such regulation may
literally kill people.32
These are simply a few examples of situations in which a government agency
is inevitably making “health-health tradeoffs” in light of the systemic effects of
one-shot interventions. Indeed, any regulation that imposes high costs will, by
virtue of that fact, produce some risks to life and health, since “richer is safer.”33
A virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it tends to overcome people’s tendency to
focus on parts of problems, by requiring them to look globally at the
consequences of apparently isolated actions.
E. Emotions and Alarmist Bias
A set of data now suggests that people are subject to “alarmist bias.”34 The
mere existence of discussions of new risks can aggravate concern, even when the
discussions take the form of assurances that the risk level is relatively low. And
when presented with information suggesting that a risk may range from A (low)
to Z (high), the high risk number is especially salient, and it appears to have a
disproportionate effect on behavior.
A recent paper by George Loewenstein et al. suggests that risk-related
concerns are often based on “feelings” rather than judgments.35 Thus risk-related
objections can be a product not so much of thinking as of intense emotions, often
produced by extremely vivid images of what might go wrong. This point is
supported by evidence that reported feelings of worry are sometimes sensitive
not to the probability of the bad outcome, but only to the severity of the bad
outcome.36 Vivid mental pictures of widespread death or catastrophe can drive a
demand for risk regulation. Consider, for example, the motivations of those who
press for regulation of airplane safety in the aftermath of an airplane crash, even
though such regulation may increase travel risks on balance (by driving up the
phenomenon, see John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk Versus Risk (1995).
32 See C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 Tulane Envt’l L.J. 235 (1998).
33 John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang, & John S. Evans, Poorer Is Riskier, 12 Risk Analysis 333, 333-35
(1992); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health-Health Analysis, 22 Ecol.
L. Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. Risk &
Uncertainty 95 (1994); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60 Pub. Interest 23 (1980); Aaron Wildavsky,
Searching for Safety 59-75 (1988).
34 See W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 Econ. J.1657, 1657-58 (1997)
(studying situations under which “[n]ew information about risks may generate alarmist actions that are not
commensurate with the magnitude of the risks”).
35 See Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K. & Welch, E. S., Risk as Feelings (unpublished draft
5/4/99).
36 Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, Draft at 12.
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price of flying and causing a shift to driving, a more dangerous form of
transportation).37
It is important to be careful with the relevant categories here. There is no
sharp distinction between “cognition” and “emotion.”38 Emotions are generally
the products of beliefs, and hence an emotional reaction to risk—terror, for
example—is generally mediated by judgments.39 But this is not always true;
sometimes the operation of the brain allows intense emotional reactions with
minimal cognitive activity.40 In any case the judgments that fuel emotions may be
unreliable. We need not venture into controversial territory in order to urge not
that emotions are free of cognition, but that some risks seem to produce
extremely sharp, largely visceral reactions. These reactions are sometimes largely
impervious to argument. Indeed, experience with “mass panics” has shown
exactly this structure, as assurances based on statistical evidence have little effect
in the face of vivid images of what might go wrong.41 Some fears even appear to
have a genetic foundation; consider, as a possible example, fear of snakes, which
appears in people who have no reason to think that snakes are dangerous.
The role of cost-benefit analysis is straightforward here. Just as the Senate
was designed to have a “cooling effect” on the passions of the House of
Representatives, so cost-benefit analysis might ensure that policy is driven not by
hysteria or alarm, but by a full appreciation of the effects of relevant risks and
their control. If the hysteria survives an investigation of consequences, then the
hysteria is fully rational, and an immediate and intensive regulatory response is
entirely appropriate.
Nor is cost-benefit analysis, in this setting, only a check on unwarranted
regulation. It can and should serve as a spur to regulation as well. If risks do not
produce visceral reactions, partly because the underlying activities do not yield
vivid mental images, cost-benefit analysis can show that they nonetheless
warrant regulatory control. The elimination of lead in gasoline is a case in point.42

37 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of the White House
Commission’s Recommendations, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 791 (1997).
38 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in the Criminal Law, 96 Colum.
L. Rev 269 (1996); Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind (1999).
39 See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (forthcoming); Elster, supra note.
40 See Loewenstein et al., supra.
41 See the discussion of Love Canal in Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 691-98 (1999).
42 See Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
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F. Separate Evaluation and Incoherence
Suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any other problem,
how much you would be willing to pay to protect certain threats to coral reefs.
Now suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any other problem.
how much you would pay to protect against skin cancer among the elderly.
Suppose, finally, that you are asked to say how much you would be willing to
pay to protect certain threats to coral reefs and how much you would be willing
to pay to protect against skin cancer among the elderly. Empirical evidence
suggests that people’s answers to questions, taken in isolation, are very different
from their answer to questions when they are asked to engage in cross-category
comparisons.43 It appears that when people assess problems in isolation, they do
so by reference to other problems in the same basic category—and that this
intuitive process is dramatically altered when people are explicitly told to assess
problems from other categories as well. The result of assessing individual
problems, taken in isolation, is to produce what people would themselves
consider a form of incoherence.
The forms of regulatory spending shown in Table I undoubtedly reflect, in
part, the kinds of irrationality that follow from judgments that are made without
close reference to other problems from different categories. Incoherence is the
natural result of the relevant cognitive processes. The argument for a form of
cost-benefit analysis is straightforward: It operates as a built-in corrective to
some of the distortions that come from taking problems in isolation. The point
applies to “contingent valuation” assessments; but it operates more broadly with
respect to expenditure decisions that otherwise risk incoherence, simply by
virtue of the fact that they operate without looking at other problems, including
those from other categories.
G. General Implications
The cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis, thus understood, is now in
place. It is true but obvious to say that people lack information and that their lack
of information can lead to an inadequate or excessive demand for regulation, or a
form of “paranoia and neglect.”44 What is less obvious is that predictable features
of cognition will lead to a demand for regulation that is unlikely to be based on
the facts. When people ask for regulation because of fears fueled by availability
cascades, and when the benefits from the risk-producing activity are not

43 See Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Iliana Ritov, & Cass R.Sunstein, Reversals of Judgment: The Effect
of Cross-Category Comparisons on Intendedly Absolute Responses (unpublished manuscript 1999).
44 See John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved:
Getting Better Results from Regulation 183 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
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registering, it would be highly desirable to create cost-benefit filters on their
requests. When interest-groups exploit cognitive mechanisms to create
unwarranted fear or diminish concern with serious problems, it is desirable to
have institutional safeguards. When people fail to ask for regulation for related
reasons, it would be desirable to create a mechanism by which government
might nonetheless act if the consequences of action would be desirable. Here too
cost-benefit balancing might be desirable, as in fact it has proved to be in
connection not only with the phase-out of lead but also with the Reagan
Administration’s decision to phase-out CFC’s, motivated by a cost-benefit
analysis suggesting that the phase-out would do far more good than harm.45
A caveat: It is entirely possible that the public demand for regulation will
result from something other than cognitive errors, even if the relevant risk seems
low as a statistical matter. People may think, for example, that it is especially
important to protect poor children from a certain risk in a geographically isolated
area, and they may be willing to devote an unusually large amount to ensure
that protection. What seems to be a cognitive error may turn out, on reflection, to
be a judgment of value, and a judgment that can survive reflection. I will return
to this point. For the moment note two simple points. Whether an error is
involved is an empirical question, subject, at least in principle, to empirical
testing. And nothing in cost-benefit analysis would prevent people from
devoting resources to projects that they consider worthy, even if the risk is
relatively low as a statistical matter.
I have not yet discussed what cost-benefit analysis might specifically entail,
and there are potentially serious controversies here. But it will be best to discuss
that question after dealing with some direct objections.
II. Objections: Populism, Quantification, and Rival Rationalities
The argument made thus far, cautious though it may seem, runs into three
obvious objections. The first involves democratic considerations; the second
points to the limitations of quantification; the third involves the possibility that
ordinary people’s judgments are based not on cognitive limitations, but on a kind
of “rival rationality.”

45 See Economic Analysis at EPA, supra note 33. See also Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New
Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 63 (1991) (Reagan administration supported aggressive regulation
largely because cost-benefit analysis from the Council of Economic Advisers demonstrated that “despite the
scientific and economic uncertainties, the monetary benefits of preventing future deaths from skin cancer far
outweighed costs of CFC controls as estimated either by industry or by EPA”).
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A. Populism
The first objection, populist in character, is captured by the opening
quotation from Senator Biden. The objection would be that in a democracy,
government properly responds to the social “demand” for law. Government
does not legitimately reject that demand on the ground that cost-benefit analysis
suggests that it should not act. On this view, a democratic government should be
accountable. Any approach that uses efficiency, or technocratically-driven
judgments, as a brake on accountability is fatally undemocratic.
The problem with this objection is that it rests on a controversial and even
unacceptable conception of democracy, one that sees responsiveness to citizens’
demands, whatever their factual basis, as the foundation of political legitimacy. If
those demands are uninformed, it is perfectly appropriate for government to
resist them. Indeed, it is far from clear that reasonable citizens want, or would
want, their government to respond to their uninformed demand. The analysis
thus far suggests that the relevant demands are, in fact, uninformed or
unreflective. If this is so, they should be subject to deliberative constraints of the
sort exemplified by cost-benefit analysis. After that analysis has been generated,
and public officials have taken it into account, democratic safeguards continue to
be available, and electoral sanctions can be brought to bear against those who
have violated the public will. The simple point is that if, once informed if the
cost-benefit tradeoff, people continue to seek some particular regulation, then
democratic considerations require government to restrict their choice.46 At the
very least, cost-benefit analysis should be an ingredient in the analysis, showing
people that the consequences of various approaches might be different from
what they seem.
B. Quantification and Expressive Rationality
I have noted that the cost-benefit chart described above raised many
questions. Those questions might be made into a thoroughgoing challenge to
cost-benefit analysis. In an extensive discussion, Lisa Heinzerling has attempted
to do precisely that.47 Heinzerling argues that many of the values depend on
controversial judgments of value, and that the table itself masks those judgments.
Her first point is that the table includes many regulations that were in fact
rejected. Some of them were not issued on the ground that their benefits would
exceed their costs. The table is also underinclusive, for many regulations have
been issued that impose dramatically lower costs than many of those included on
the table. But by itself this is no indictment of cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, it
46 At least assuming the decisions involve nothing peculiar or invidious, such as racial animus.
47 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
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provides support for cost-benefit analysis insofar as it suggests that the tool has
resulted in a rejection of undesirable regulations.
But Heinzerling goes further. She contends that many of these numbers
depend on controversial judgments about how to discount future benefits.
Above all, the charts depend on a 10% discount rate, whereas the agencies
tended to use a lower discount rate, or not to discount at all. Heinzerling also
suggests that the charts depend on downward adjustment of the agency’s
estimates of risk. Her own estimates result in the following risk table, adjusted
for inflation.
Table III: Corrected (?) Table on Cost-Effectiveness of Regulations

Regulation

Adjusted Cost Estimate
(Thousands of 1995
dollars)

Asbestos (OSHA 1972)

$700

Benzene (OSHA 1985)

$2,570

Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA 1986)

$6,610

Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984)

$3,020-$5,780

Uranium Mill Tailings/Inactive (EPA 1983)

$2,410

Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978)

$8,570

Uranium Mill Tailings/Active (EPA 1983)

$3,840

Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976)

$12,420

Asbestos (OSHA 1986)

$3,860

Arsenic (OSHA 1978)

$24,490

Arsenic/Los-Arsenic Copper (EPA 1986)

$5,740

Land Disposal (EPA 1986)

$3,280

Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985)

$31,100

This table may be more accurate than Table I; certainly there are problems
with any approach that assumes a 10% discount rate. But even if Heinzerling’s
table is better, it offers an ironic lesson, serving largely to confirm the point that
current regulatory policy suffers from poor priority-setting. The disparities here
are not as dramatic, and they certainly do not establish pervasive overregulation;
but they do support the view that resources are being misallocated.
Heinzerling does not, however, conclude that this revised table is the
appropriate basis for evaluating regulatory policy. Her aim is not to come up
with a better table from which to reassess government behavior. On the contrary,
she takes her argument to be a basis for rejecting cost-benefit analysis altogether.
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This, then, is a lesson about “the perils of precision.”48 Heinzerling also suggests
that it “would be better if we left the picture blurry, and declined to connect the
dots between all the confusing and sometimes conflictiung intuitions and
evidence.”49 She is concerned that “some, probably many, people will be fooled
into believing that numerical estimates of risks, costs, and benefits are impartial
reflections of factual reality, in which case the likely result of increased reliance
on quantification in setting regulatory policy will be that the side that best
obscures the value choices implicit in its numbers will prevail.”50
There is considerable truth here; but I think that Heinzerling’s lesson is
overdrawn. Truth first: If an agency says that the cost of regulation is one
hundred million dollars, and the benefit seventy million dollars, we still know
much less than we should. It is important to know who bears these costs, and if
possible with what consequences. Will wages be lower? Whose wages? Will
prices be higher? Of what products? A disaggregated picture of the benefits
would also be important; what does the seventy million dollar figure represent?
Consider, for example, a recent table explaining that the costs of skin cancer,
from health effects of reducing tropospheric ozone, are between $290 million and
$1.1 billion, with dollar subtotals for skin cancers and cataracts.51 By itself, this
table is insufficiently informative to tell people what they need to know.
Heinzerling is therefore on firm ground if she means to suggest that the
dollar numbers cannot substitute for a fuller inquiry into what is at stake. Any
cost-benefit analysis should include more than the monetary values by, for
example, showing what the values are about, such as life-years saved and
accidents averted (see the Appendix for illustrations). But her own table suggests
that the general conclusion—that cost-benefit analysis can illuminate and
discipline inquiry—remains unassailable. If regulation ranges from tens of
thousands to tens of millions per life saved, at least there is a presumptive
problem. One of the functions of cost-benefit balancing is to help show where
limited resources should go. In fact there is much to be gained from attempting
to quantify various effects, to the extent that this is possible. A regulation of
particulates is hard to evaluate without knowing, for example, the number of
deaths averted and the range of consequences for morbidity: How many work-

48 Id. at 2042.
49 Id. at 2069.
50 Id. at 2068.
51 See Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the
NAAQS, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 142A, 145 (1997). In fairness to the authors, it should be noted that a previous
table in their essay describes adverse health effects in quantitative terms by listing the numbers of cases
averted.
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days will be saved that would otherwise be lost? How many hospitalizations will
be avoided? How many asthma attacks will be prevented? It could even be
useful to attempt to describe these effects in terms of “quality-adjusted life
years,”52 knowing that here too, a good analyst will go back and forth between
bottom lines and the judgments that go into their creation.
I suspect that there may be theoretical claims behind Heinzerling’s
skepticism about quantification. She may believe that many of the goods at stake
in regulation (human and animal life and health, recreational and aesthetic
opportunities) are not merely commodities, that people do not value these goods
in the same way that they value cash, and that cost-benefit analysis, by its
reductionism, is inconsistent with people’s reflective judgments about the issues
at stake. Arguments of this sort have been developed in some philosophical
challenges to cost-benefit analysis.53
Such arguments are convincing if cost-benefit analysis is taken to suggest a
controversial position in favor of the commensurability of all goods—if costbenefit is seen to insist that people value environmental amenities, or their own
lives, in the same way that they value a bank account, or if cost-benefit is taken as
a metaphysical claim to the effect that all goods can be aligned along a single
metric, or if five lives saved is seen as the same, in some deep sense, as $20-$30
million saved. Part of what people express, in their daily lives, is a resistance to
this form of commensurability, and some goods are believed to have intrinsic as
well as instrumental value.54 The existence of qualitative differences among
goods fortifies the claim that any “bottom line” about costs and benefits should
be supplemented with a more qualitative description of the variables involved.
But cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as embodying a reductionist account
of the good, and much less as a suggestion that everything is simply a
“commodity” for human use. It is best taken as pragmatic instrument, agnostic
on the deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex judgments
where multiple goods are involved. To put it another way, cost-benefit analysis
might be assessed pragmatically, or even politically, rather than metaphysically.
We should conclude that the final number may provide less information
than the ingredients that went into it, and that officials should have and present
cost-benefit analysis in sufficiently full terms to enable people to have a concrete
sense of the effects of regulation. This is an argument against some

52 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995);
American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 1999 WL 300618 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 1999).
53 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).
54 See id.
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overambitious understandings of what cost-benefit balancing entails. But it is not
an argument against cost-benefit balancing.
C. Rival Rationalities
The final objection to the discussion thus far is the most fundamental. On this
view, cost-benefit analysis is not desirable as a check on ordinary intuitions,
because those intuitions reflect a kind of “rival rationality.” Ordinary people
have a complex understanding of what it is that they want to maximize. They do
not simply tabulate lives saved; they ask questions as well about whether the
relevant risk is controllable, voluntary, dreaded, equitably distributed, and
potentially catastrophic. Consider the Table 4.
Some people suggest that to the extent that ordinary people disagree with
experts, they have a “thicker” or “richer” rationality, and that democracy should
respect their judgments.55 On a more moderate view, government’s task is to
distinguish between lay judgments that are products of factual mistakes
(produced, for example, by the availability heuristic), and lay judgments that are
products of judgments of value (as in the view that voluntarily incurred risks
deserve less attention than those that are involuntarily occurred ones).56 In any
case the “psychometric paradigm” is designed show how ordinary people’s
judgments are responsive to an array of factors other than lives saved.57
Table 4: Aggravating and mitigating factors in risk judgments
Risk Traits

Aggravating

Mitigating

Familiarity

New

Old

Personal control

Uncontrollable

Controllable

Voluntariness

Involuntary

Voluntary

Media attention

Heavy media
coverage

Ignored by media

Equity

Unfairly distributed

Equitably distributed

Children

Children at special
risk

Children not at risk

Future generations

Future generations at
risk

Future generations not
at risk

55 See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective,
in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 241 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985);
56 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
57 See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 44
U. Chi. Leg. F. 59 (1997).
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Reversibility

Irreversible

Reversible

Identifiability of
victims

Victims known

Victims not identifiable

Accompanying
benefits

Benefits clear

Benefits invisible

Source

Human origin

Created by nature

Trust in relevant
institutions

Low trust in relevant
institutions

High trust in relevant
institutions

Timing of adverse
effects

Effects delayed

Effects immediate

Understanding

Mechanisms poorly
understood

Mechanisms understood

Precedents

History of accidents

No past accidents

One problem with this view is that it may not be a criticism of cost-benefit
analysis at all; it may suggest only that any judgment about benefits and costs
(whether or not based on willingness to pay) will have to take account of
people’s divergent assessments of divergent risks. In principle, there is no
problem with doing exactly that. There is, however, reason to question the nowconventional view that qualitative factors of this kind in fact explain people’s
disagreement with experts about certain risks of death. In fact I do not believe
that the “psychometric paradigm” can defend its own central claims. The first
point is technical. In the relevant studies, the key factors—voluntariness,
controllability, potentially catastrophic nature—have not been generated
spontaneously or independently by subjects. Instead those who conduct the
relevant research ask people to rank risks along these dimensions . From this
information it cannot be said that ordinary people think that these qualitative
differences justify departing from the “lives saved” criterion. The evidence is
simply too indirect.
Now this does not mean that the “rival rationalities” view is wrong. There is
independent evidence to suggest that people consider some deaths to be worse
than others.58 They are apparently willing to pay more, for example, to prevent a
cancer death than to prevent an unforeseen instant death, and there is some
evidence that voluntarily incurred risks receive less social concern than risks that
are involuntarily incurred. Distributional judgments also appear to play some
role in assessments about how to allocate scarce resources. But these points raise
further questions.59
58 Some of the data is collected in Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 259 (1997).
59 I draw heavily in the next pages from id.; Margolis, supra note, contains an excellent discussion of this
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No doubt it is possible that people’s judgments about risk severity are a
product of some of the more qualitative considerations listed above; this idea
leads to the widespread view that ordinary people have a “richer” rationality
than do experts, since ordinary people look at the nature and causes of death, not
simply at aggregate deaths at issue. But it is also possible that an apparently
“rich” judgment that a certain risk is severe, or not severe, depend not on wellconsidered judgments of value, but instead on an absence of ordinary contextual
cues, on a failure to see that tradeoffs are inevitably being made, on heuristic
devices that are not well-adapted to the particular context, or instead on a range
of confusing or confused ideas that people cannot fully articulate. When people
say, for example, that the risk of nuclear power is very serious, they may be
responding to their intense visceral concern, possibly based on (uninformed)
statistical judgments about likely lives at risk and on their failure to see (as they
do in other contexts) that that risk is accompanied by a range of social benefits.
Thus it is possible that a judgment that a certain risk of death is unusually bad is
not a “rich” qualitative assessment but an (unreliable) intuition based on a rapid
balancing that prominently includes perceived lives at stake and the perceived
presence of small or no benefits associated with the risk-producing activity.
Thus the question becomes whether citizen judgments that certain deaths are
especially bad can survive a process of reflection. My conclusion is that
understood in a certain way, the notions of dreaded deaths and unfairly
distributed deaths are fully reasonable and deserve a role in policy. But the
special concerns about deaths stemming from involuntarily run and
uncontrollable risks raise serious doubts; as frequently invoked, they do not
justify according additional concern to deaths that “code” as a product of
involuntary or uncontrollable risks. At most, they suggest that government
might spend more resources on deaths where the cost of risk-avoidance is
especially high, and devote less attention to deaths where the cost of riskavoidance is especially low.
1. Dread
It is often said, on the basis of evidence like that outlined above, that
especially dreaded deaths deserve special attention. Deaths from cancer and
AIDS fall in this category. There is nothing at all mysterious to this idea. The
underlying point is probably that the relevant deaths are especially grueling and
hence there is a kind of “pain and suffering premium”—not merely a life lost, but
an antecedent period of intense emotional and physical difficulty as well. This
period of intense difficulty might impose costs on those with the illness and on
friends and family members as well. Sudden, unanticipated deaths can be
point, from which I have learned a great deal.
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dreaded too—consider the extremely unpleasant idea of dying in an airplane
crash. But the dread here stems from some factor (perhaps terror) different from
and much shorter than the extended period of suffering that precedes some
deaths. Thus it might be concluded that dreaded deaths deserve special attention
in accordance with the degree of suffering that precedes them. A special problem
with cancer deaths is that at least some of the time, people like to have upwardsloping utility. It is particularly bad to be in a situation in which things will
constantly get worse.60 With cancer deaths, the slope goes downward fairly
consistently until the point of death.
2. Voluntariness
People seem to perceive voluntarily incurred risks as less troublesome than
involuntarily incurred risks. Consider diverse public reactions to airplane crashes
and automobile crashes. Or consider the fact that tobacco is by far the largest
source of preventable deaths in the United States. Why do we not devote much
more of our regulatory effort to reducing smoking? The reason seems to lie in a
judgment that smoking is a voluntary activity and hence the resulting deaths are
less troublesome than other sorts of deaths. Here—it might be said—people have
voluntarily assumed the relevant risks.
a. Puzzles: high cost of avoidance rather than involuntariness?
It is tempting to think that the apparent lay preference for according greater
weight to “involuntary” risks to life requires significant qualification of the
criterion of lives or life-years saved. But a simple reference to voluntariness, if
taken to suggest something special about “lay rationality,” raises many puzzles.
The most important problem is that it is not simple to know when a risk is
voluntarily incurred. “Voluntariness” may be entirely absent in the case of an
unforeseeable collision with an asteroid; but voluntariness is not, in the cases
under consideration, an all-or-nothing matter. Instead it is a matter of degree.
Return to the conventional thought that airplane crashes are “involuntary” and
automobile crashes more “voluntary.” Certainly it would be possible to see the
risks from air travel as voluntarily run; people have a choice about whether to
fly, and when they do fly, they pay a certain amount for a certain package,
including risks of various sorts. The same is true of automobile safety—and it is
not in any way less true, however disparately the two kinds of risks may “seem.”
Perhaps people are responding to the perceived fact that they have no control
over the pilot’s behavior, whereas they have considerable control over
automobile safety since they are themselves drivers. But airlines respond to
60 See George Loewenstein & Nachom Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. Lab.
Econ. 67, 71-75 (1991); George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Negative Time Preference, 81 Am. Econ. Rev.
(Papers & Proc.) 347, 347 (1991).
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market forces, including the market for safety, and many people injured in
automobile accidents are not at fault, and thus along the dimension of
voluntariness this is hardly a crisp distinction. The difference between the two
risks is hardly so categorical as to justify an assessment that they fall on poles of
some voluntariness-involuntariness divide. Indeed, it is not clear even what is
meant by the suggestion that one is voluntary and the other is not. Something
else appears to underlie that suggestion.
b. Three cases
To shed some light on the issue, let us consider three classes of cases. First,
consider the question whether workers exposed to cancer risks are voluntarily or
involuntarily so exposed. If workers do not know about such risks—if they lack
relevant information—we seem to have an easy case of involuntariness. Thus it
makes sense to say that risks are run involuntarily when the people running
them do not know about them. Lack of adequate information provides a
legitimate case for a judgment of involuntary exposure to risk. But of course
information itself can be obtained at some cost, pecuniary or otherwise. We are
thus dealing, in cases of this kind, with high costs of risk avoidance, in the
distinctive form of high costs of acquiring relevant information.
Second, suppose that people who are exposed to a certain risk are aware of
the risk, but are not in an actual or potential contractual relation with the riskproducer. Many victims of pollution are in this position; recall that in surveys air
pollution is a particular source of public concern., People in Los Angeles may
well know that they face high levels of smog. Are they exposed involuntarily? If
we conclude that they are, we may mean that a risk is incurred involuntarily
when and in the sense that it is typically very expensive for people to avoid it—
and when someone else can reduce the risks more cheaply. Here a claim that the
risk is faced “involuntarily” may mean that those who “run” the risk can reduce
it only at very high cost, at least compared to those who “produce” the risk. (The
quotation marks are necessary for obvious Coasian reasons.) Or it is possible that
we mean that on nonutilitarian grounds, the people exposed to the risk have a
moral entitlement to be free from it, at least if they have not explicitly sold it.
But turn now to a third class of cases, involving a wage package or contract
that does include compensation for the relevant risks. Assuming that point, we
might want to distinguish between two different possibilities. In a case of a highlevel scientist, knowledgeable about relevant risks and involved in work that he
finds rewarding, people may well conclude that we have an instance of
voluntariness. (In the same category can be found the case of an astronaut.) But
people might not say the same about a low-level worker who does not like his
work at all (cf. Anderson, 1993). What distinguishes the two cases? If knowledge
is present, or if the compensation package includes payment for the relevant risk,
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it is not clear how the two differ. The underlying judgment must be that the
compensation is inadequate, perhaps because background inequality has
produced a wage package that seems unfair even if voluntarily chosen by the
parties.
From this discussion it seems reasonable to speculate that any judgment that
a risk is run “involuntarily” is probably based on 1) a lack of knowledge of the
risk, or, more accurately, high costs of obtaining information about the risk, 2) a
belief that information to one side, it would be very costly for people to avoid the
risk, or 3) a belief that the risk is unaccompanied by compensating benefits,
notwithstanding their belief that the contract is in some sense worth signing. It
may seem hard to make sense of 3); what might be at work is a judgment that
background inequalities are producing the relevant bargain (not by itself a good
reason to disrupt the deal), or perhaps a belief that workers are competing to
their collective detriment, and an agreement not to compete would be in their
best interests. On this view, the question whether a risk is run voluntarily or not
is often not a categorical one but instead a question of degree, associated with
information cost, risk-reduction cost, and the existence or not of accompanying
benefits. Of course there are interesting background questions about why and
when a risk “codes” as voluntary or involuntary; undoubtedly the answer
depends a great deal on heuristic devices and selective attention.
c. The purpose for which the risk is incurred and problems of responsibility and blame
Death-risks may seem “voluntarily” run when people do not approve of the
purpose for which people run the relevant risks, and involuntarily run when
people think that the purpose for which the risk is run is laudable. It is
predictable that people will not want to pour enormous taxpayer resources into
lowering the risks associated with sky-diving, even if the dollars/life-years saved
ratio is quite good. By contrast, it is doubtful that people think that it is wrong to
spend enormous resources on the prevention of death from childbirth or being a
police officer, even though the decision to have a child is (with appropriate
qualifications) voluntary, and so too with the decision to become a police officer.
People may think that when the appeal or purpose of the activity is associated
with its very riskiness, resources should not be devoted to risk-reduction. At
least this is plausible when the risk is an independent good or part of the benefit
of the activity. And it is easy to imagine a belief that some activities—unsafe sex,
cigarette smoking—are like the sky-diving case, perhaps because the risk is
sometimes part of the benefit, perhaps because the risks are not incurred for a
purpose that observers find worthy or valuable.
It might seem that this consideration—the purpose for which the risk is
incurred—overlaps with or is even identical to the question whether there are
high costs of risk-avoidance. When the costs are low, as in sky-diving, the
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purpose might seem inadequate. But on reflection the two ideas are hardly the
same. It may well be that failing to sky-dive, or sky-diving with some safetyincreasing technology, imposes high costs on sky-divers. There seems to be an
objective judgment, not necessarily connected with subjective costs, in the claim
that some risks are voluntary, or deserve less attention, because they are run for
inadequate purposes.
Relatedly, airplane accidents may seem different from automobile accidents
not because the former are less voluntary, and not because of diverse costs of risk
avoidance, but because the victims of airplane accidents are less blameworthy
than the victims of automobile accidents, in the sense that the death is not a
product of their own negligence or misconduct. In the case of an airplane
disaster, weather conditions, mechanical failure, or pilot error are likely causes;
in the case of an automobile accident, it is more likely (though not of course
certain) that the victim could have avoided death through more careful driving.
The point is crude, since many victims of automobile accidents are not drivers,
and many drivers in accidents do not behave negligently. But the perceived
difference, in a significant number of cases, may underlie an apparent judgment
of “voluntariness” that is really a judgment about responsibility and
blameworthiness. In any case judgments are likely to be affected, and distorted,
by the fact that drivers seem to be risk optimists—with 90% ranking themselves
as safer than the average driver and less likely to be involved in an accident.61
This is another place—illusions of control and risk optimism—where cognitive
psychology argues in favor of cost-benefit analysis.
d. Underlying questions and assumption of risk
We might therefore conclude that whether a risk qualifies as involuntary
raises many of the questions raised by the question whether government should
regulate the market at all. A risk might be characterized as involuntarily run
because affected people lack relevant information; because the transactions costs
of bargaining are high; because the risks should be seen to amount to
externalities; because collective action problems make market outcomes
unsatisfactory since (for example) workers are in a prisoner’s dilemma best
solved through law; or because some motivational or cognitive defect makes
successful solutions through markets unlikely. These of course are among the
conventional grounds for regulation in the first instance. When a risk seems
voluntary, and not worthy of substantial regulatory resources, the term
“voluntary” is serving as a placeholder for an argument that there is no sufficient
ground for government action, because the accompanying benefits are high or

61 See Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions 10 (1994).
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the risk-reduction costs are low, and because market arrangements take adequate
account of these facts.
Should voluntarily run risks of death receive no public attention, on the
ground that the relevant people have already received compensation? We might
imagine a death-risk to be incurred voluntarily when an informed person
decided to incur it in light of its costs and benefits. Suppose, for example, that
someone purchases a small car with fewer safety features, or decides to become a
boxer, an astronaut, or a police officer in a dangerous neighborhood. If a death
results from such a choice, it might seem that the chooser has no legitimate
ground for complaint; there has been ex ante compensation for the risk. But even
in such cases, it is not clear that government lacks a role. If government can
reduce a serious risk at low cost, and thus eliminate deaths, it should do so even
if there was ex ante compensation for the relevant risk. There is a general point
here. Sometimes observers confuse two quite different questions: (1) Should
people be banned from running a certain risk, when they have run that risk
voluntarily? (2) Should government attempt to reduce a certain risk, when
people have run that risk voluntarily? A negative answer to question (1) does not
answer question (2).
From this point we should conclude that a lay judgment that a risk is
“voluntary” should not be decisive. A better understanding of what factors
underlie and support that judgment should be used for purposes of regulatory
policy. The basic criterion of decently livable life years might, then, be adjusted
upward when those at risk lack relevant information or when the costs of riskavoidance are especially high—or downward when those at risk have the
information and when the costs of risk-avoidance are low.
3. Ripple Effects
The psychological evidence suggests, thought it does not squarely identify,
an important and relevant fact: Some deaths produce unusually high
externalities, in the sense that they generate widespread losses, including those
stemming from empathy and fear, in a way that leads to predictable pecuniary
and nonpecuniary costs. Consider, for example, the death of the President of the
United States, a death that imposes a wide range of costs and that taxpayers
invest significant resources to prevent. Part of the reason for allocating those
resources is undoubtedly the greater risk that the President will be murdered;
but the external costs associated with his death are undoubtedly important too. A
parallel can be found in the relatively large level of resources devoted to prevent
the assassination of many important public officials. But the point is hardly
limited to the highest public officials. An airplane hijacking or crash, partly
because it is likely to be well-publicized, may produce large externalities in the
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form of empathy and fear. It may even deter air travel by making people
unusually frightened of air travel, simply because of heuristic devices
(availability) and other predictable factors that make people’s probability
assessments go awry. This fear may be damaging because it is itself a utility loss
and because it may lead people to use less safe methods of transportation, such
as automobiles. Or an airplane crash might be especially disturbing because the
sudden loss of dozens or hundreds of people seems so unusually and senselessly
tragic, in a way that produces large empathetic reactions, or because it signals the
further possibility of random, apparently inexplicable events in which large
numbers of people die.
Some catastrophes are especially disturbing because they appear to produce
pointless and especially unnatural deaths. A recent airplane crash in Israel,
killing over seventy soldiers, is an example, producing an extended period of
national mourning—stemming from the youth of those who were killed, the fact
that they were serving their country, and the highly unusual character of the
accident, apparently stemming from preventable human error. These
considerations suggest that special attention might justifiably be devoted to air
safety in the time following a crash even if the relevant precautions do not cause
a significant drop in deaths. The same idea may justify special safeguards of
nuclear reactors. Even a minor and harmless accident may produce a kind of
day-to-day fearfulness that properly places a role in an official calculus, at least if
educative efforts cannot work against public fears to the extent that they are
irrational or based on error-producing heuristic.
Special public concern about catastrophic events may thus reflect a judgment
that certain kinds of deaths have ancillary effects, well beyond the deaths
themselves. Consider in this regard the “Buffalo Creek Syndrome,” documented
several times in the aftermath of major disasters. Nearly two years after the
collapse of a dam that left 120 dead and 4000 homeless, psychiatric researchers
continued to find significant psychological and sociological changes; survivors
were characterized by a loss of direction and energy, other disabling character
changes, and a loss of communality.62 One evaluator attributed this loss of
direction specifically to “the loss of traditional bonds of kinship and
neighborliness.”63 The non-linearity of lay evaluations of risk in the context of
potential disasters may thus reflect a high premium on avoiding the distinctive
kinds of losses distinctly associated with catastrophes. If so, differences between

62 Daniel Fiorino, Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis, 9 Risk Analysis 293 (1989).
63 Daniel Fiorino, Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis, 9 Risk Analysis 293, 295 (1989). See
also J.D. Robinson, M.D. Higgins, & P.K. Bolyard, Assessing Environmental Impacts on Health: A Role for
Behavioral Science, 4 Envir. Impact Assessment Rev. 41 (1983).
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lay and expert assessments rest on genuine value differences (four times as many
deaths may be much more than four times as bad) rather than on factual errors in
cognitive processes of ordinary people.
These various points raise a number of questions. We do not yet have a full
understanding of the basis for special public concern with catastrophes.
Moreover, the argument for devoting special resources to deaths with
externalities is strongest when the externalities do not reflect irrationality or
cannot be reduced through other means. For example, some of the fear that
follows certain widely reported deaths is based on confusion or ignorance about
actual probabilities; if it is possible to dispel the confusion, the fear should
dissipate as well. Here the question is whether government can legitimately
spend extra resources to avert the harms associated with irrational public
attitudes. Perhaps information-based strategies would be preferable to allocating
additional resources to deaths whose occurrence produces widespread panic. On
the other hand, there are undoubtedly instances in which information is
ineffective, and there are also cases in which high externalities, in the form of
special fear, are not a product of factual ignorance. In such cases government is
justified in giving additional resources to death-prevention.
4. Inequitable Distribution
Some risks might be, or be thought to be, inequitably distributed, above all
because the victims are disproportionately members of socially disadvantaged
groups. Certain deaths might, for example, be concentrated among poor people,
African-Americans, or homosexuals. Consider the risk of lead paint poisoning
suffered by inner city children, or the risk of AIDS, faced disproportionately by
African-Americans as well as homosexuals. Citizens or elected representatives
may think that inequitably distributed risks of death deserve special attention
from government. Here the relevant deaths are bad not because each one is
especially bad to experience, but because there is social concern about the fact
that a certain cause of death falls disproportionately on members of certain social
groups.
When such social concern exists, and when it is not objectionable on
constitutional or other grounds, it is entirely legitimate for officials to respond.64
Thus regulators should be permitted to use a uniform number per life or lifeyears saved; this is itself a (modest) redistributive strategy, because wealthy
people (simply because they are wealthy) are willing to pay more to reduce risks
than nonwealthy people. Regulators might also be permitted to give distributional

64 It is inadequate to response that potential compensation could be made to losers in the context of efficient
programs; if the compensation is only potential, the concern remains.
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weights to risks whose distributional incidence is especially troublesome.65 These
weights might take a technical form (through adding numbers to the ones that
would otherwise be used) or appear via the official judgment about how to
proceed after the cost-benefit analysis has been supplied (through deciding in
favor of a strategy not strictly suggested by the numbers). The distributional
concern supports special efforts to control AIDS; environmental risks like
asthma, which are concentrated among inner city children; and perhaps the
spread of diseases whose incidence is concentrated among women. My minimal
claim is that if there is a public judgment in favor of according a distributional
weight to a certain death-reduction policy, and if that judgment is not
unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate, policy makers should not be barred
from respecting that judgment.
5. No Rival Rationality
I conclude that there is no “rival rationality,” and that people are willing to
depart from the “lives saved” criterion for reasons that cast a clearer light on
what it is that they are attempting to maximize. More particularly:
a. People are willing to pay a premium to avoid deaths that involve
a high degree of pain and suffering. At least presumptively, this desire,
or judgment, should be respected by government regulators; the
presumption might be rebutted if, for example, the “premium” seems so
high as to suggest that some kind of irrationality is at work.
b. People are willing to devote more resources to protect children.
This judgment may depend on a belief that children are typically more
vulnerable to risk, in the sense that they cannot protect themselves, or on
a belief that more life-years are at stake when children are in jeopardy. In
either case, this judgment too deserves respect.
c. People are willing to pay a premium to avert catastrophes. This
may depend on a belief that catastrophes have “ripple effects” that
outrun lives actually lost. A plane crash killing 100 people may be worse
than 100 deaths from poor diet, if the consequence of the former is to
create pervasive fear and anxiety. A shooting in a high school may
warrant special attention, keeping lives saved constant, if only in order
to ensure that students and parents are not constantly fearful about the
safety of schools. These “ripple effects” qualify as social costs and at first

65 See the critical comments about willingness to pay in Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000), and in Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, J. Legal Stud.
(forthcoming 2000).
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glance seem to deserve special attention. The major qualification is that it
may be possible to address them directly, rather than to cater (pander?)
to them. Suppose, for example, that education can assure the public that
flying is generally quite safe. If information can accomplish this end, it is
better to provide it than to engage in regulation that is costly and that
has no purpose other than to reassure.
d. People are willing to devote more resources to protect against
dangers when the costs of risk avoidance are high. Perhaps people do
not have information about certain risks, and perhaps information is
costly to obtain. Perhaps third parties are in danger, and perhaps it is
costly for them to avoid the danger. This point may involve fairness; it
may involve efficiency. It involves fairness if people believe that those
who bear high costs from risk avoidance should not, in principle, have to
bear those costs. If this is the underlying belief, then it may follow that
those who can easily avoid the cost of some risk should, in principle, do
exactly that. The point involves efficiency if the judgment is that the best
means of reducing aggregate costs (public as well as private) is to
regulate the entity that is imposing the relevant risk.
e. People may believe that it is especially important to protect
vulnerable or traditionally disadvantaged groups against certain risks.
If, for example, AIDS is concentrated among African-Americans and
homosexuals, there may be a special reason to devote resources to its
prevention, even if quantitatively identical risks receive less attention.
These various points suggest that there is no “rival rationality.” The question
is whether people believe that some dangers deserve more attention than
(quantitatively identical) others, and if so, whether that belief can survive critical
scrutiny. But these points also suggest that it is wrong to think that policy should
follow the judgments of experts focussed on the single question of “lives at
stake.”66 This is not the social maxim and for reflective citizens. Such citizens
have a different view about what their government ought to be doing. That
different view does not embody any exotic conception of rationality.

66 This is the apparent recommendation in Margolis, supra note, though I am not sure that Margolis would
agree with what I am suggesting here.
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III. An Incompletely Theorized Agreement on Cost-Benefit Analysis?
A. Problems With Aggregated Willingness to Pay
Thus far I have suggested that cost-benefit analysis is a sensible approach to
cognitive problems faced by ordinary people in the assessment of risk. I have
also suggested that there is no democratic objection to using cost-benefit analysis
as an ingredient in decisions, even a crucial ingredient, and that cost-benefit
analysis can be understood in a way that responds to reasonable concerns about
quantification and about the idea that the only thing to be maximized is total
lives saved (or, somewhat better, life-years saved).
But none of this deals with the general question how cost-benefit analysis
should be understood. In the least contentious formulation—the formulation that
I have used here—cost-benefit analysis is simply a form of open-ended
consequentialism, an invitation to identify the advantages and disadvantages of
regulation,67 an invitation that does not say anything about appropriate weights.
The virtue of this formulation is that it is uncontentious; the vice is that it is
vacuous. People can agree with it, but it does not mean anything. In its most
contentious formulation, cost-benefit analysis depends on asking people how
much they are “willing to pay” for various goods, and making decisions depend
on the resulting numbers.68 Problems with this approach lie in a possible lack of
private information; its possible distributional unfairness (since willingness to
pay depends on ability to pay); potential differences between private willingness
to pay and public aspirations69; and collective action problems of various sorts
that might draw into doubt the privately-expressed amounts.70 It will be
worthwhile to spell out these points in a bit more detail.
“Willingness to pay” is a simple way to capture people’s valuations, and for
this reason it has practical advantages. Indeed, it is a good place to start,
especially in the absence of anything better. But it also suffers from several
problems. First, willingness to pay may be a product of cognitive and
motivational distortions of various kinds. Willingness to pay judgments may be
insufficiently informed or reflective with respect to both facts and values. For
67 See Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000); compare the
notion of cost-benefit analysis as a decision procedure in Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
68 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1998).
69 See Daphna Lewinson-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public
Goods, 108 Yale L.J. 377 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice ch. 2 (1997).
70 See Daphna Lewinson-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public
Goods, 108 Yale L.J. 377 (1999); Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent
Valuation and the Market Analogy, 46 Japanese Econ. Rev. 23, 29 (1995).
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example, people may overstate the risks from various hazards that receive
disproportionate media attention. If this is so, it seems odd to base government
policy on those judgments.
It is also possible that people will be willing to pay little to avoid some bad X
simply because they are used to it and their preferences have adapted
accordingly.71 For example, people may not care about scenic areas simply
because they have not been exposed to them. Preferences based on lack of
information or adaptation to deprivation are hardly a good basis for regulatory
policy. They need not be taken as given and translated into law. In any case
private preferences may be a product of social norms over which individuals
have little control, by which they live, but which they would like to change if
they could. If people are willing to pay little to avoid some risk (for example, of
smoking) because of prevailing norms that they would wish changed,
willingness to pay is unjustified as a basis for policy, since the norm could be
changed through collective action.72
Second, willingness to pay is imperfectly correlated with utility—at best
the first is a proxy for the second—and the two should not be confused in
principle. One problem is that poor people are willing to pay less than wealthy
people simply by virtue of being poor, and their willingness to pay for something
(eg, a reduced mortality risk) is crudely connected with the utility that they
would gain from it. In the face of disparities in wealth, willingness to pay should
not be identified with expected utility or with the value actually placed on the
good in question.73 Third, there is a purely distributive concern.74 Because poor
people have less money than wealthy people, they are willing to pay less for
equivalent goods (such as reduced risks to life). The result of the use of
willingness to pay would be to produce greater expenditures to protect wealthy
people than poor people, a controversial result to say the least.75 Fourth, the
willingness to pay criterion will produce losers as well as winners, and many of
the losers will go uncompensated; it is scant comfort to say that they could be

71 See Sen, supra; Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983).
72 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice ch. 2 (1997).
73 This seems to me a mistake in Viscusi’s illuminating discussion, W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, J. Legal
Stud. (forthcoming 2000).
74 This is a standard point in economic discussions of cost-benefit analysis, though it is ignored in many
discussions by economic analysts of law. See, e.g., Richard Tresch, Public Finance: A Normative Theory 541
(1981): “In our opinion the distributive question is the single most important issue in all of cost-benefit
analysis.” Tresch discusses how distributional considerations might be incorporated. See also A. Allan
Schmid, Benefit-Cost Analysis 157-190 (1989), with a discussion of distributive weights at pp. 170-72.
75 At least unless poor people are compensated for any losses via side payments.
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compensated with side payments or a system of optimal taxation. Hence an
attempt to defend cost-benefit analysis by reference to the efficiency criterion, as
measured by private willingness to pay, runs into great difficulties, at least
unless steps are taken to ensure against distributional bias.76
Fifth, and finally, there may be differences between the choices people make
as consumers and the choices that they make as citizens, and it is not clear that
the former should be preferred. The context of citizenship may evoke otherregarding or altruistic values, or preferences, that are not reflected in private
choices. This is partly because aggregating private willingness to pay can
replicate various collective action problems faced in the private domain; people
may be willing to pay more simply because they know that other people are
contributing as well.77 If this is so, it makes no sense to base policy on private
willingness to pay, where the collective action problem arises.
In any case we might think that government policy should be based on the
reasons given for one or another outcome, and the fact that people are “willing to
pay” a lot or a little for some outcome tells us too little about whether good
reasons exist. Before discussion, for example, people may be willing to pay a fair
bit to discriminate on the basis of sex, and they may be willing to pay little to
protect large populations of animals that are at risk. These judgments may
change as a result of reason-giving in the public domain. In other words,
government is a place for exchanging reasons for one or another course or action.
It is not simply a maximizing machine, taking private willingness to pay as the
foundation, whatever the source or the grounds of pre-discussion preferences.
A particular problem here is that people may not want to spend a great deal
to protect (for example) environmental amenities because they seek to protect
their (relative) financial position.78 A regulatory program supported by all might
maintain relative position, which may be what people care about. Current
willingness to pay numbers do not take account of this possibility. There is thus
good reason for an empirical speculation here, one that suggests that current

76 There are some complexities here. Of course markets are ordinarily based on willingness to pay, and
poor people are willing to pay less for safety, simply because they have less. Poor people are willing to pay
less, as a class and other things equal, for safer cars, safer neighborhoods, and so forth. The aggregated
willingness to pay approach simply generalizes this phenomenon; there is nothing unusual about it. Thus a
system that assigns uniform values to life embeds a kind of subsidy, or redistribution, to people with
relatively less resources or, more precisely, to people with less willingness to pay. A system of uniform
values might be thought sufficient to correct any distributional bias in cost-benefits analysis.
77 See Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (Oxford
University Press) (1985); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra; Amartya Sen, supra; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and
Social Justice (1997).
78 See Frank, supra note.
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numbers are far too low. Much further work remains to be done to test whether
people would in fact be willing to spend more for safety, or for environmental
amenities, if the result would be significant decreases in absolute income but the
same relative income.
Nor would it be sensible to disregard the presence of tragic choices, as when
cost-benefit analysis leads to a choice of course A over course B, but course A
leads to uncompensated losers (a group whose members may suffer from serious
illnesses and even death).79 Perhaps it is possible, in such cases, to restructure
social arrangements so as to reduce or eliminate the tragedy. But even if this is
so, a cost-benefit analysis, of the sort to be described, can help inform a decision
about what tragedy-reducing course to take, and whether such a course is
worthwhile at all.
B. Incomplete Theorization: Cost-Benefit Analysis As Political, Not Metaphysical
Often it is possible to resolve hard questions of law and policy without
resolving deeply contested issues about justice, democracy, or the appropriate
aims of the state.80 Often it is possible to obtain an incompletely theorized
agreement on a social practice, and even on the social or legal specification of the
practice. In many areas of law and public policy, people can reach closure about
what to do despite their disagreement or uncertainty about why, exactly, that
ought to do it. Thus people who disagree about the purposes of the criminal law
can agree that rape and murder should be punished, and punished more
severely than theft and trespass. Thus people can support an Endangered Species
Act amidst disagreement about whether the protection of endangered species is
desirable for theological reasons, or because of the rights of animals, plants, and
species, or because of the value of animals, plants, and species for human beings.
A great advantage of incompletely theorized agreements is that they allow
people of diverse views to live together on mutually advantageous terms. An
even greater advantage is that they allow people of diverse views to show one
another a high degree of both humility and mutual respect.
I believe that incompletely theorized agreement is possible here; at least this
should be the goal of those attempting to understand the uses of cost-benefit
analysis in regulatory policy. For reasons just discussed, it would be difficult to
obtain agreement on the view (which seems to me implausible) that all questions
of regulatory policy should be resolved by asking how much people are “willing

79 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility Of Goodness: Luck and Ethics In Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
(1983); Martha Nussbaum, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000).
80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A
Time (1999).
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to pay” for various social goods.81 But my basic claims here are that it should be
possible for diverse people to agree on presumptive floors and ceilings for
regulatory expenditures, and that the presumptions can do a great deal of useful
work for policymaking and for law. In short, a great deal can be done without
confronting the hardest theoretical questions raised by contentious specifications
of cost-benefit analysis.
An obvious question here is: Who could join this incompletely theorized
agreement? Who would reject it? My principal claim is that the agreement could
be joined by a wide range of reasonable people, including utilitarians and
Kantians, perfectionist and political liberals, and those who accept and those who
doubt the idea that private willingness to pay is the appropriate foundation for
regulatory policy. There is room here for deliberative democrats who emphasize
the need for government to reflect on private preferences, rather than simply to
translate them into law.82 A prime purpose of the approach is to ensure more in
the way of reflection; cost-benefit analysis, as understood here, is a guarantee of
greater deliberation, not an obstacle to it. Nor is the approach rigid. Under the
proposed approach, agencies have the authority to abandon the floors and
ceilings if there is reason for them to do so. If, for example, agencies want to
spend a great deal to protect African-American children from a risk
disproportionately faced by them, they are entitled to do so, as long as they
explain that this is what they are doing, and so long as what they are doing in
reasonable.
C. Eight Propositions
Here, then, are eight propositions, offered in the hope that they might attract
support from diverse theoretical standpoints. I do not attempt to defend them in
detail here; The goal is to provide a starting point for the effort to anchor costbenefit analysis in an incompletely theorized agreement about regulatory
policies.

81 See Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. (forthcoming
1999).
82 Absolutists of various kinds might refuse to join an agreement on these principles. Perhaps their refusal
would be most reasonable in the case of the Endangered Species Act, where nothing said below explains
why millions of dollars should be spent (at least in opportunity costs) to say members of ecologically
unimportant species. It would be possible, however, to imagine a kind of “meta” cost-benefit analysis that
would point in this direction, perhaps on the ground that it greatly simplifies decision without imposing
high costs overall. For the regulatory issues dealt with here, an absolutist approach seems hard to justify,
not least because there are dangers to life and health on both sides of the equation. Note that I am dealing
here with environmental and related risks, and hence many of the most contentious issues (e.g., how to treat
the wrongdoer’s motivation, or how to deal with rights violators) do not arise. See Sen, The Discipline of
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra.
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1. Agencies should identify the advantages and disadvantages of proposed
courses of action, and also attempt to quantify the relevant effects to the extent
that this is possible. When quantification is not possible, agencies should
discuss the relevant effects in qualitative terms, and also specify a range
of plausible outcomes, e.g., annual savings of between 150 and 300 lives,
or savings of between $100 million and $300 million, depending on the
rate of technological change. The statement should include the full
range of beneficial effects. The problem of particulates and ozone
regulation poses some serious difficulties to challengers to cost-benefit
analysis (CBA); if the EPA is not to do a form of CBA, what is it to do,
concretely?
2. The quantitative description should supplement rather than displace a
qualitative description of relevant effects. Both qualitative and quantitative
descriptions should be provided. It is important to know the nature of
the relevant effects, e.g., lost workdays, cancers averted, respiratory
problems averted. To the extent possible, the qualitative description
should give a concrete sense of who is helped and who is hurt, e.g.,
whether the beneficiaries are mostly or partly children, whether the
regulation will lead to lost jobs, higher prices, more poverty, and so
forth. Where the only possible information is speculative, this should be
noted, along with the most reasonable speculations.
3. Agencies should attempt to convert nonmonetary values (involving, for
example, lives saved, health gains, and aesthetic values) into dollar equivalents.
This is not because a statistical life and (say) $5 million are the same
thing, but to promote coherence and uniformity and to ensure sensible
priority-setting. There is nothing magical or rigid about the dollar
equivalents; the conversion is simply a pragmatic tool to guide analysis
and to allow informed comparisons.
4. Agencies entrusted with valuing life and health should be controlled, by
statute or Executive Order, via presumptive floors and ceilings. For example,
a statute might say that a statistical life will ordinarily be valued at no
less than $2 million and no more than $10 million. Evidence of worker
and consumer behavior, suggesting a valuation of between $5 million
and $7 million per statistical life saved, is at least relevant here. The fact
that the willingness to pay numbers are in this range is hardly decisive,
but it is supplemented by the fact that similar numbers appear to
represent the midpoint of agency practice. Thus both market and
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governmental measures point in the same basic direction.83 OMB
should establish presumptive floors and ceilings for various regulatory
benefits. If an agency is going to spend (say) no more than $500,000 per
life saved, or more than $20 million, it should have to explain itself.
Actual agency practice reveals a mixed record. EPA now values a life at
$4.8 million; some agencies go as high as $5.6 or as low as $1; and some
agencies do not provide specific numbers at all.
5. Agencies should be permitted to adjust the ceilings and floors, or to choose
a low or high end of the range, on the basis of a publicly articulated and
reasonable judgment that such an adjustment or such a choice is desirable.
Perhaps adjustments could be made if, for example, poor people are
especially at risk. There should be no adjustments “downwards” for
poor people; in other words, the fact that poor people are willing to
spend less to protect their own lives (because they are poor) should not
call for a correspondingly lower expenditures by government. The
principal danger here is that well-organized groups will be able to use
equitable arguments on behalf of their preferred adjustments. It is
important to ensure a degree of discipline here, and perhaps the
dangers of interest-group manipulation are serious enough to suggest
that uniform numbers or ranges might be used, or that the
presumptions are strong and rebuttable only in the most compelling
cases.84
6. Agencies should be permitted to make adjustments on the basis of the
various “qualitative” factors discussed above. For example, they might add
a “pain and suffering premium,” or increase the level of expenditure
because children are disproportionately affected or because the victims
are members of a disadvantaged group. It would be reasonable to
conclude that because AIDS has disproportionate adverse effects on
homosexuals and poor people, special efforts should be made to ensure
against AIDS-related deaths. To the extent possible, they should be
precise about the nature of, and grounds for, the relevant adjustments,
especially in light of the risk that interest-group pressures will convert
allegedly qualitative adjustments in illegitimate directions.85

83 Note, however, that if relative position is what matters, these numbers may be too low, for reasons stated
above.
84 See Viscusi, Risk Equity, supra note.
85 See id.; see also James Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks (1999) (showing that allegedly
equitable shifts are driven by political pressures not mapping onto any sensible conception of equity).
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7. The appropriate response to social fear not based on evidence, and to related
“ripple effects,” is education and reassurance rather than increased regulation.
Sometimes public concern about certain risks is general and intense,
even though the concern is not merited by the facts.86 The best response
is educational; the government should not expend significant resources
merely because an uninformed public believes that it should. But if
education and reassurance fail, increased regulation may be defensible
as a way of providing a kind of reassurance in the face of intense fears,
which can themselves impose high costs of various kinds. (Consider, for
example, the possibility that people who afraid of risks of plane crashes
will shift to driving, a more risky method of transportation; consider
also the fact that the fear is itself a cost.)
8. Unless the statute requires otherwise, judicial review of risk regulation
should require a general showing that regulation has produced more good than
harm, on a reasonable view about valuation of both benefits and costs.87 On
this view, courts should generally require agencies to generate and to
adhere to ceilings and floors. But they should also allow agencies to
depart from conventional numbers (by, for example, valuing a life at
less than $1 million, or more than $10 million) if and only if the agency
has given a reasonable explanation of why it has done so. The ultimate
task would be develop a kind of “common law” of cost-benefit analysis,
authorizing agencies to be law-making institutions in the first instance.88
IV. Conclusion
I have suggested that cost-benefit analysis, often defended on economic
grounds, can be urged less contentiously on cognitive grounds. Cost-benefit
analysis, taken as an inquiry into the consequences of varying approaches to
regulation,89 is a sensible response not only to interest-group power, but also to
limited information and to predictable problems in the public demand for
regulation. These problems include the use of the availability heuristic; social
amplification of that heuristic via cascade effects; a failure to see the benefits that
86 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683
(1999).
87 See Margolis, supra note.
88 This has started to happen in various areas. See the development of a common law of “risk significance”
under OSHA, discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, Michigan Law Review
(forthcoming 1999).
89 There is no alternative to regulation. What is sometimes described as deregulation, or a failure to
regulate, is actually regulation via the common law.
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accompany certain risks; a misunderstanding of systemic effects, which can lead
to unanticipated bad (and good) consequences; and certain emotional reactions
to risks. In all of these areas, an effort to identify costs and benefits can properly
inform analysis.
These points do not show how cost-benefit analysis should be specified.
Here I have raised questions about the willingness to pay criterion and suggested
that at least in principle, it would be obtuse to attempt to assess regulatory
proposals via a uniform number for lives saved; but I have also suggested that
presumptive ranges, for life as well as other beneficial effects on health and other
values, would be an excellent way to clarify and order regulatory policy, in a
way that should lead both to greater consistency and more overall protection. If
ordinary market behavior and ordinary government behavior point to a similar
basic range (e.g., $3 million to $7 million per life saved), that is an excellent place
to start.
My ultimate hope is that it would be possible to produce a convergence on a
form of cost-benefit analysis that should be understood as a pragmatic
instrument and that ought not to be terribly contentious—a form of cost-benefit
analysis that does not take a stand on highly controversial questions about what
government ought to do, and that promises to attract support from people with
diverse conceptions of the right and the good. I have suggested here that the
most promising source of such an agreement is not only or even mostly
neoclassical economics, but also behavioral economics and cognitive psychology.
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